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Imagine that someone recovers relatively quickly, say, within two 
or three months, from grief over the death of a spouse whom she 
loved, and who loved her. Imagine, in other words, that within two 
or three months, the bereaved person’s emotional well-being and 
her ability to work and to perform other vital tasks return to the 
levels they were at before her spouse died, and she regains her 
ability and desire to form new relationships, including romantic 
relationships. Does the fact that this person’s grief is neither pro-
longed nor highly disruptive indicate that her relationship was de-
ficient in some way? More broadly, is adapting to the loss and get-
ting on with our lives shortly after the deaths of people who are 
close to us in tension with the aim of having good relationships 
with these people, or doing well by them? 
Cases in which someone feels such tension are familiar from lit-
erature and from ordinary life: In Upheavals of Thought, Martha 
Nussbaum reports that much of her daily life, including much of 
her professional activity, resumed, more or less without alteration, 
shortly after her mother’s death.1 She found her quick return to 
normal activities comforting in some respects, but also viewed it 
“with suspicion, as a possible sign of deficiency in love.”2 In the 
poem “Home Burial,” Robert Frost depicts a bereaved mother who 
becomes overwhelmed with resentment as she describes respects 
in which her husband has been absorbed in “everyday concerns” 
since their child’s death.3 And in A Grief Observed, C.S. Lewis re-
ports that his initial recovery from grief over his wife’s death 
                                                 
1 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 25–28. 
2 Ibid., p. 28.  
3 Robert Frost, “Home Burial,” in The Poetry of Robert Frost: The Col-
lected Poems, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 2002). 
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brought “a sort of shame.”4 Nevertheless, Anglophone philoso-
phers have largely neglected the significance of our grief over the 
deaths of people we love, despite the fact that philosophers since 
antiquity have devoted enormous attention to our attitudes toward 
our own deaths.5  
Though neglected, the project of figuring out what our grief indi-
cates about the quality of our relationships is important. Bereave-
ment research shows that, contrary to what many assume, people 
who grieve over the deaths of their spouses, children, or others 
who are close to them often — perhaps typically — prove resilient; 
that is, they recover from grief within just two or three months. 
For our purposes, recovery from grief has two dimensions: first, it 
involves recovering from the sadness associated with grief and re-
turning to one’s emotional baseline, and, second, it involves re-
turning to one’s baseline functioning.6 As the above examples il-
                                                 
4 C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 53. 
5 The literature on attitudes toward one’s own death includes Epicurus, 
Letter to Menoeceus; Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe; Bernard 
Williams, “The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortali-
ty,” in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973), pp. 82–100; Thomas Nagel, “Death,” in Mortal Questions (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1–10; Ben Bradley, Well-
Being and Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Samuel 
Scheffler, “Fear, Death, and Confidence,” in Death and the Afterlife (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 83–110. Discussions of grief 
include the following: Martha Nussbaum (Upheavals of Thought, Chs. 1 
and 3) appeals to claims about grief in order to characterize the structure 
of several emotions. Troy Jollimore (“Meaningless Happiness and Mean-
ingful Suffering,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 [2004]: 333–347) 
appeals to claims about grief to challenge the view that suffering is al-
ways intrinsically disvaluable. Robert Solomon (“On Grief and Grati-
tude,” in In Defense of Sentimentality [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004], pp. 75–107) argues that grief is, in some sense, morally obligato-
ry. Dan Moller (“Love and Death,” Journal of Philosophy 104 [2007]: 
301–316) argues that there is something regrettable about recovering 
from grief shortly after a loved one’s death. And Michael Cholbi (“Grief’s 
Rationality, Backward and Forward,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research [forthcoming]) develops an account of the rationality of grief. 
We will discuss Moller’s argument below.   
6 See G. Bonanno et al., “Resilience to Loss in Bereaved Spouses, Be-
reaved Parents, and Bereaved Gay Men,” The Journal of Personality and 
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lustrate, anxieties about feeling better and getting on with our 
lives shortly after the deaths of people we love are commonplace, 
and these anxieties may yield guilt or resentment, heightening 
whatever suffering accompanies the loss. So, on the one hand, if 
recovering from grief shortly after a loved one’s death diminishes 
the quality of one’s relationship with her, then thinking about the 
significance of grief and recovery may help us confront hard truths 
about our relationships with people who are close to us. And on 
the other hand, if, as we believe, recovering quickly need not di-
minish the quality of one’s relationship, then thinking about grief’s 
significance might undercut one common source of pointless suf-
fering. 
Beyond this, thinking about the nature and significance of grief 
deepens our understanding of the topic of this volume, namely, 
the moral psychology of sadness. Sadness, together with certain 
characteristic patterns of attention and motivation, is an essential 
aspect of grief, but the sadness associated with grief has some dis-
tinctive features. Someone may, to borrow an example from Rob-
ert Solomon, simply wake up in the morning feeling sad, without 
being sad “about anything in particular”7; but, unlike the sadness 
that one experiences in Solomon’s example, the sadness associated 
with grief is “about something more or less specific.”8 When 
someone grieves, she is sad about some specific loss, for example, 
the death of her parent, the breakup of her marriage, or the disso-
lution of some organization to which she was deeply committed. 
                                                                                                             
Social Psychology 88 (2005): 827–843; S. Zisook et al., “The Many Faces 
of Depression Following Spousal Bereavement,” Journal of Affective 
Disorders 45 (1997): 85–94; A. Futterman, J. Peterson, and M. Gilewski, 
“The Effects of Late-Life Spousal Bereavement over a 30-Month Inter-
val,” Psychology and Aging 6 (1991): 434–41; and Dale Lund, “Impact of 
Spousal Bereavement on the Subjective Well-Being of Older Adults,” in 
Lund et al., eds., Older Bereaved Spouses (New York: Hemisphere, 
1989), pp. 3–15. Moller cites these studies in “Love and Death,” pp. 301–
3. For an accessible overview of bereavement research, see George Bo-
nanno, The Other Side of Sadness: What the New Science of Bereave-
ment Tells Us About Life After Loss (New York: Basic Books, 2009).  
7 Robert Solomon, In Defense of Sentimentality (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004), p. 81. 
8 Ibid., p. 82. 
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And in the cases we will discuss, the person who grieves is sad 
about the death of someone to whom she bears some personal re-
lationship. So our examination of the nature and significance of 
grief is, in part, an examination of a common, and often debilitat-
ing, form of sadness about the deaths of those who are close to us.  
We will respond to two related arguments for the view that when 
someone recovers relatively quickly from grief over her beloved’s 
death, the fact that her grief is not prolonged or highly disruptive 
indicates some grave deficiency in her relationship with the person 
who died. For simplicity’s sake, we will focus mainly on cases 
where people survive the deaths of their spouses, but much of our 
discussion also applies to cases where people survive the deaths of 
their children, parents, siblings, or others to whom they bear cer-
tain personal relationships.9 First, we will discuss what we call the 
argument from unimportance, which Dan Moller develops in 
“Love and Death.”10 Put roughly, this argument states that when 
someone recovers relatively quickly from grief over her beloved’s 
death — and so, the beloved’s absence fails to make a prolonged, 
debilitating impact on her life — her recovery is troubling in one 
respect, because it means that the person who died was relatively 
unimportant to her. Then we will discuss what we call the argu-
ment from desertion, which appears in some classic literary dis-
cussions of grief, but does not, as far as we know, figure promi-
nently in any philosophical work.11 This second argument states 
that when someone feels better and gets on with her life shortly 
after her beloved’s death, her recovery is regrettable in one re-
spect, because it constitutes a form of desertion, a serious failure 
of solidarity with the person who died. These two arguments rep-
resent two complementary strategies for vindicating anxieties 
about feeling better and adapting to the loss shortly after the 
deaths of people who are close to us. The former argument states 
                                                 
9 Mark Alfano pointed out, in discussion, that although the professional 
literature on grief discusses the loss of spouses, children, parents, and 
friends, it almost entirely neglects the loss of siblings. One exception to 
this trend is Elizabeth DeVita-Raeburn, The Empty Room (New York: 
Scribner, 2004), which provides an illuminating discussion of grief over a 
sibling’s death.    
10 “Love and Death,” pp. 308–310. 
11 See Frost, “Home Burial” and Lewis, A Grief Observed, p. 53. 
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that reacting to the loss in this way reveals that, prior to their 
deaths, our loved ones failed to occupy certain significant roles in 
our lives, while the latter states that reacting in this way consti-
tutes a failure, on our parts, to do well by our loved ones after 
their deaths. 
To be clear, the scope of these arguments is limited in two im-
portant respects. First, the degree to which people care about ex-
hibiting certain emotional reactions after their loved ones die may 
vary considerably from one culture to another. People in industrial 
Western countries tend to regard grief as primarily a psychological 
phenomenon and, accordingly, tend to care about the character 
and duration of the bereaved person’s sadness. By contrast, people 
in many other countries tend to emphasize bodily manifestations 
of grief, and tend to care not about the individual bereaved per-
son’s psychological reactions, but rather about whether and how 
she performs mourning rituals that reinforce her ties to the com-
munity.12 It may be that some differences between Western and 
non-Western attitudes toward grief derive from reasonable disa-
greements about the relative significance of personal autonomy on 
the one hand, and one’s relation to the community on the other.13 
In any case, the arguments that we will discuss, and our responses 
to them, are most appropriately addressed to Western audiences.   
Second, these arguments concern cases where someone who sur-
vives her spouse’s death experiences grief, but recovers relatively 
quickly. So we will focus on that common type of case, as opposed 
to the rarer class of cases in which someone who survives her 
spouse’s death does not experience grief at all. Cases of the latter 
sort, in which grief is entirely absent, may have objectionable fea-
tures that cases of the former sort, in which grief is short-lived and 
minimally disruptive, do not possess. To begin with, according to a 
generally accepted view, evolution selects for bonds of emotional 
                                                 
12 For discussion of bodily manifestations of grief in non-Western cul-
tures, see Arthur Kleinman, Social Origins of Distress and Disease: De-
pression, Neurasthenia, and Pain in Modern China (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986). For discussion of mourning rituals in non-
Western cultures, see Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness, Chs. 4, 10, 
and 11. 
13 See Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness, p. 47.  
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attachment between mates, parents and children, and so on; and 
when death severs these relationships, survivors’ grief serves 
largely to express such bonds.14 Because grief is so deeply embed-
ded in human life, a person’s failure to experience grief at all after 
her spouse’s death may seem profoundly alien, in ways that expe-
riencing short-lived grief does not.15 Furthermore, according to a 
widely accepted view, experiencing certain emotional reactions is 
part of appreciating the goodness or badness of our circumstances. 
So when someone merely judges, in a detached way, that she sur-
vived her spouse’s death, but fails to grieve, this failure may pre-
vent her from appreciating the loss, in a way that experiencing 
brief, but intense, sadness over the loss does not.16 We do not have 
space to discuss these considerations in detail, and so we will set 
aside cases in which surviving spouses fail to grieve altogether. 
The argument from unimportance and argument from desertion 
purport to show that when someone recovers from grief shortly 
after her spouse’s death, she thereby shows that her relationship 
with her spouse was deficient in some significant respect. We 
claim, roughly, that both arguments overlook relevant circum-
stances in which someone whose relationship is good in all rele-
vant respects may nevertheless recover from grief, and go on to 
form a new romantic relationship, shortly after her beloved’s 
death; and so neither argument succeeds. Nevertheless, as we will 
explain in the closing section, the arguments make salient some 
vexing concerns about recovery that cannot simply be dismissed. 
                                                 
14 See John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss, Vols. 1–3, (London: Hogarth 
Press & Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1969, 1973, and 1980). 
15 See Douglas Maclean, “Pain and Suffering” (unpublished manuscript).  
16 Jesse Prinz defends this view of emotions in Gut Reactions: A Percep-
tual Theory of Emotion (New York: Oxford, 2004), Chs. 3 and 10. 
Jollimore (“Meaningless Happiness,” pp. 339–342) argues that failing to 
grieve at all over a loved one’s death prevents one from adequately ap-
preciating the loss. Moller (“Love and Death”, pp. 310–313) defends the 
stronger claim that failing to grieve for an extended period prevents one 
from adequately appreciating the loss. Contrary to what Moller assumes, 
brief, but intense, sadness over a loved one’s death may yield deep, last-
ing insight into the nature of the loss. See, for example, Bonanno’s (The 
Other Side of Sadness, Ch. 4) descriptions of interview subjects who were 
resilient after the deaths of family members.       
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We said above that responding to arguments that purport to vindi-
cate people’s anxieties about feeling better and adapting to the loss 
shortly after a loved one’s death is apt to undercut a source of 
needless suffering, and our discussion serves this aim. But beyond 
this, responding to these particular arguments serves another, 
more constructive aim, namely, clarifying what it means both to be 
important to people who are close to us and to stand in solidarity 
with them. So responding to these arguments does not just prom-
ise to quell anxieties about whether our relationships with now 
deceased loved ones were deficient in some way, or whether we 
failed to do well by them after they died; it also promises to deep-
en our understanding of what it means to cultivate good relation-
ships with our loved ones during their lives.  
But before we discuss these arguments in detail, we should briefly 
distinguish them from a different worry about recovering quickly 
from grief over the deaths of people who are close to us, namely, 
the view that such recoveries are regrettable because they show 
that we did not care deeply about the people who died. Though 
this view is mistaken, it is familiar and, we believe, intuitively 
plausible. Acceptance of something like this view helps explain 
both Nussbaum and Lewis’s unease about their respective recover-
ies from grief, and it helps account for the distress that the mother 
in “Home Burial” feels when she considers her husband’s recov-
ery.17 Furthermore, this view may seem to derive support from 
plausible claims about the nature of love. To love someone is, in 
part, to want her to flourish and to be invested in her flourishing. 
But being so invested renders us vulnerable to suffering “psychic 
harm” when people we love suffer misfortunes, and so the fact that 
someone suffers relatively little after her spouse’s death may seem 
to show that she did not care deeply about her spouse.18   
Dan Moller presents decisive grounds for rejecting this view. First, 
he cites a wealth of psychological studies, many of which we men-
tioned above, which show that it is common for people who sur-
                                                 
17 See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 28; Lewis, A Grief Observed, 
p. 41; and Frost, “Home Burial,” lines 91-97.  
18 See Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” in The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 80–94. 
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vive their spouses’ deaths to recover from grief within just two or 
three months.19 He suggests, plausibly, that in many such cases, 
the survivor already demonstrated her concern for her spouse dur-
ing the spouse’s lifetime, say, by making personal sacrifices in or-
der to promote his interests, or by feeling pain when he suffered 
even minor misfortunes. So the fact that she recovers quickly from 
grief does not cast serious doubt on the quality of her love.20 Sec-
ond, Moller points out that our responses to the deaths of people 
who are close to us form part of a broader pattern of reactions to 
loss: we tend to return quickly to our emotional and functional 
baselines, that is, we tend to be resilient, after the loss of all sorts 
of goods that we otherwise seem to care about deeply. This pattern 
holds not only in cases where people survive their spouses’ deaths, 
but also in cases where they survive the deaths of their children21, 
lose their jobs22, sustain debilitating injuries23, and suffer other 
severe health problems24. Often, we can account for people’s resili-
ence in such cases, without making the counterintuitive claim that 
they did not care deeply about what they lost, by appealing to psy-
                                                 
19 We mention these studies in Note 6.  
20 “Love and Death,” p. 307. A fascinating project called the Changing 
Lives of Older Couples study provides additional grounds for denying 
that resilience after the deaths of people who are close to us reveals defi-
ciencies in our love for them. Researchers interviewed roughly 1,500 
married people and followed them for nearly ten years. When partici-
pants died during the course of study, researchers interviewed surviving 
spouses at regular intervals. They found that “the quality of the marriages 
of the resilient people were not much different from anybody else’s”; that 
is, “the relationship was not a factor in determining who would cope well 
after the loss” (Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness, p. 70). For a de-
tailed description, see the project website http://cloc.isr.umich.edu/. 
21 Bonanno et al., “Resilience to Loss.” 
22 Dan Gilbert et al., “Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting,” The Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy 75 (1998): 617–38. 
23 P. Brickman, D. Coates, and R. Janoff-Bulman, “Lottery Winners and 
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?,” The Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 917–27. 
24 J. Riis et al., “Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 134 (2005): 3–9. 
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chological adaptive mechanisms that tend to help humans cope 
with misfortunes. One such mechanism involves contrast effects: 
recent misfortunes contrast sharply with vivid memories of earlier, 
better states and have substantial negative effects on our emotion-
al well-being, but “after a short while, this contrast effect wears off 
and we get used to what we now regard as the new baseline.”25  
Moller rightly concludes that, given the ways that many people 
demonstrate their concern for their spouses during the spouses’ 
lives, and given the availability of plausible alternative explana-
tions of the resilience that people tend to exhibit after their spous-
es die, the fact that someone recovers relatively quickly from grief 
over her spouse’s death does not, by itself, provide good evidence 
that she failed to care deeply about the person who died. If there is 
something problematic about being resilient after the deaths of 
people close to us, it cannot be — despite the initial plausibility of 
this suggestion — that reacting to the loss in this way reliably indi-
cates some deficiency in our love. The argument from unim-
portance and argument from desertion both purport to show that 
the problem lies elsewhere — that if someone proves resilient after 
her spouse’s death, then, even if she loved her spouse dearly, the 
fact that she does not experience prolonged, debilitating sadness 
over the loss is still deeply regrettable.   
The Argument from Unimportance 
Moller’s argument from unimportance states that when someone 
recovers from grief, and goes on to remarry, shortly after her 
spouse’s death, her reaction to the loss is deeply regrettable be-
cause it means that her spouse was relatively unimportant to her. 
On one natural interpretation, the claim that certain people are 
unimportant to us means that we do not care about these people; 
but, for reasons we just described, this cannot be what Moller has 
in mind. Rather, he claims that someone’s reacting in this way to 
her spouse’s death shows that the spouse was unimportant in a 
different sense, which has two main elements. First, the fact that 
the survivor returns, within a month or two, to her emotional and 
functional baselines means that her spouse’s presence did not 
make a significant difference to her life. More precisely, she did 
not need her spouse; to the contrary, the spouse’s absence made 
                                                 
25 Moller, “Love and Death,” p. 306. 
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only a comparatively minor impact on her. Second, the fact that 
the survivor enters into a new, lasting, and similarly fulfilling ro-
mantic relationship after some “depressingly brief interval” means 
that her now deceased spouse was, to a considerable degree, re-
placeable; that is, any significant roles that the spouse did play in 
her life — for example, providing security, sexual intimacy, or 
companionship — could be played, more or less equally well, by 
someone else instead.26  
Moller clarifies this conception of importance by citing examples 
of the following sort:  
Our importance to an organization like a baseball team 
or Congress is great when we make an enormous dif-
ference to its operations, when our absence wreaks 
havoc, and when we are unique and irreplaceable in 
what we do. Conversely, claims of importance or sig-
nificance are inflated when it turns out that nothing 
we do really matters or that a year’s leave of absence 
would go unnoticed and we could be easily replaced.27  
We have great importance, in this sense, to other people when our 
absence would have “a profound and lasting effect on them, just as 
the sudden injury of a key baseball player should have a disruptive 
and debilitating effect on the team.”28 Severing our relationships 
with these people “would make a deep impact on their ability to 
continue to lead happy worthwhile lives”.29 In short, when some-
one has great importance, in this sense, to another person, she 
makes a difference to that person’s life that is well worth caring 
about, and which no one else, or few others, could make. So the 
argument from unimportance states that being resilient after the 
death of one’s spouse is deeply regrettable because it means that 
the spouse failed to make such a difference to one’s life.30   
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 301. 
27 Ibid., p. 309. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 To be clear, Moller views these considerations from the perspective of 
someone who contemplates her own death and imagines her surviving 
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The mere fact that this argument rests on a conception of im-
portance that does not essentially involve being an object of some-
one’s care, but rather involves making a difference to someone’s 
life that is worth caring about, is not, by itself, problematic. To the 
contrary, there are familiar, appealing conceptions of a good mar-
riage according to which each spouse makes some significant dif-
ference to the other’s life. Rather, the problem is that the more 
precise characterization of importance on which the argument 
rests overlooks relevant ways in which spouses in good marriages 
can make significant differences to each other’s lives. Once we rec-
ognize these other ways of making a difference, we can see that 
there may be cases in which someone proves resilient after her 
spouse’s death, even though her spouse made some difference to 
her life that was well worth caring about. Moller’s account of what 
it takes to have great importance to someone has two main ele-
ments: one must play a significant role in the person’s life, and one 
must be irreplaceable in that role, or in other words, one must per-
form better in that role than any available substitute would per-
form. We can best respond to the argument if we first consider the 
roles that confer importance and then turn to irreplaceability.  
Moller’s argument rests on the assumption that in order to have 
great importance to someone — that is, in order to make a differ-
ence to someone’s life that is worth caring about — one has to play 
a role in enabling that person to function, or to function at some 
high level, in some respect that is worth caring about. Someone 
who, by Moller’s lights, has great importance to her spouse might 
give her spouse the emotional support or physical assistance that 
he needs, say, in order to maintain some level of psychological 
health, perform well at his job, or maintain some level of content-
ment with his life as a whole. In her absence, her spouse would 
fare substantially worse in one or more of these respects for an ex-
tended period. He would not just get on with his life, say, by rely-
                                                                                                             
spouse’s reaction to the loss. By contrast, we view them from the perspec-
tive from which, it seems, anxieties about recovery typically arise, name-
ly, the perspective of a survivor. But our response to the argument ap-
plies no matter which perspective we adopt. Put roughly, the argument 
fails to show that a resilient survivor’s relationship with her now de-
ceased spouse was deficient in any significant respect, and so it fails to 
show that such resilience is regrettable, whether it is viewed from the 
perspective of the now deceased spouse or from that of the survivor. 
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ing in different ways on other people who were close to him, by 
acquiring new skills that enabled him to achieve a comparable lev-
el of flourishing on his own, or by focusing on some narrower and 
more manageable, but similarly fulfilling, set of projects. In short, 
a person who has great importance to her spouse plays an indis-
pensable role in bringing it about that the spouse leads some life 
or other that is worthwhile, or highly worthwhile. To be clear, this 
need not mean that the person’s spouse is incapable of living even 
a minimally decent life without her — perhaps he could scrape by 
on his own. Rather, it means that, at the very least, the person’s 
spouse needs her in order to maintain some high level of flourish-
ing.  
This view about the role that one must play in someone’s life in 
order to have great importance to her seems to rest on the more 
fundamental view that, to be important to more or less anything at 
all, one must help determine whether or how well that thing func-
tions. This underlying view may seem initially plausible when we 
consider whether someone is important to an organization. Organ-
izations have functions: a function of Congress is to make laws, a 
function of a baseball team is to win baseball games, and a func-
tion of a business corporation is to make money for its sharehold-
ers. It may seem, in some cases, that all we care about with respect 
to an organization is whether and how well it functions, and so it 
may seem, in such cases, that the only way to make a significant 
difference to the organization is to enable it to serve one or more 
of its functions better than it could do otherwise. So, if we clarify 
our conception of importance, as Moller does, by thinking about 
what it means to be important to an organization, like Congress or 
a baseball team, then it may seem natural to adopt the underlying 
view that we just described. But once we move from the institu-
tional to the personal sphere, it becomes clear that this view is too 
restrictive, and therefore mistaken. 
A person functions well insofar as she leads some life or other that 
is worthwhile, or in other words, insofar as she flourishes in some 
way or other. But with respect to our own lives, we do not just care 
whether we flourish in some way or other; we also come to value 
particular characteristics that help make us distinctive, and in vir-
tue of which we flourish in some particular way. So one can make 
a significant difference to a person’s life not only by playing a role 
in enabling her to function, or to function well, but also by playing 
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a role in determining what kind of person she turns out to be. 
Someone who makes a difference to her spouse’s life by playing 
this latter role might, for example, cultivate her spouse’s love of 
modern dance, awaken his sense of adventure, or prompt him to 
reconsider convictions that he had never seriously questioned. In 
other words, she helps shape concerns, convictions, or other pat-
terns of thought, behavior, or emotional response that constitute 
her spouse’s character, and more generally, constitute his way of 
being in the world. For that matter, spouses are not the only peo-
ple who exert such influence on each other: friends define and 
adopt aims that they pursue together; parents teach their children 
to embrace certain ideals; and children, in a very different way, 
radically alter their parents’ sense of what matters.31 In each case, 
someone cultivates a relationship of care and trust with another 
person, and in so doing, helps determine, in some way that is 
worth caring about, what kind of person her beloved turns out to 
be.  
Once we distinguish these two ways of making a significant differ-
ence to someone’s life, namely, helping determine whether or how 
well someone functions and helping determine what kind of per-
son she turns out to be, we can see that the argument from unim-
portance fails to show that when someone manages to recover 
quickly from grief over her spouse’s death, her reaction to the loss 
is regrettable. Of course, the fact that this person returns relatively 
quickly to her emotional and functional baselines shows that she 
can get on relatively well, in some respects, without her spouse, 
and so it shows that her spouse failed to make one type of signifi-
cant difference to her life. But, crucially, her recovery does not 
show that her spouse failed to make any significant difference at 
                                                 
31 In the cases that we just described, someone plays a causal role in ena-
bling her beloved to acquire or maintain certain valued character traits, 
or other valued characteristics. Mark Alfano and Joshua August Skorburg 
(“The Embedded and Extended Character Hypotheses,” in Philosophy of 
the Social Mind, ed. J. Kiverstein [New York: Routledge, 2017], pp. 465–
478) argue that we also determine, in a rather different way, what kinds 
of people our loved ones turn out to be. They argue that a person’s char-
acter traits may be partly constituted by features of her social environ-
ment, including features of her relationships with those who are close to 
her. So, on this view, our relationships with our loved ones not only cause 
them to have certain character traits, but also help constitute those traits.  
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all — it does not show that her spouse was unimportant to her, full 
stop — because the spouse may nevertheless have helped deter-
mine, in relevant ways, what kind of person she is. 
On one familiar, deeply plausible conception, spouses can have a 
good marriage partly in virtue of the role that each plays in helping 
determining what kind of person the other turns out to be, wheth-
er or not each plays some indispensable role in enabling the other 
to function, or to function well.32 Recall that, on Moller’s view, 
when we have great importance to people in virtue of our roles in 
improving their functioning, these people do not just rely on us to 
achieve certain particular aims, or trust us in ways that render 
them vulnerable to betrayal. They also need us in such a way and 
to such a degree that our absence would have “a profound and 
lasting … impact on their ability to continue to lead happy, worth-
while lives.”33 Of course, being a good spouse may require stand-
ing ready to support one’s beloved if she comes to need one in this 
way, say, because she suffers an injury that renders her unable to 
function without assistance. But the fact that someone’s spouse 
does not need her in this way does not, according to the view that 
we accept and which we are now considering, constitute a defi-
ciency in the relationship. Playing a vital ongoing role in shoring 
up a spouse’s ability to function, or to function at some high level, 
is not essential for having a good relationship with her.  
To the contrary, on this view, spouses who play no such role in 
shoring up each other’s functioning may nevertheless cultivate a 
good marriage partly by working together to build a shared life.34 
In marriages that conform to this ideal, each spouse does make a 
                                                 
32 To be clear, we do not assume that there is one authoritative concep-
tion of a good marriage; there may be many conceptions that are worth 
valuing. Also, we cannot present anything like a complete conception of a 
good marriage here. Rather, we will discuss relevant features of one con-
ception that is, we believe, widely accepted and well worth valuing.  
33 Ibid., p. 309. 
34 See C.S. Lewis, “Friendship,” in The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1960), pp. 57–90 and Benjamin Bagley, “Loving Someone in Par-
ticular,” Ethics 125 (2015): 477–507 for more detailed discussions of re-
lated conceptions of good friendships and good romantic relationships 
respectively. 
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significant difference to the other’s life, but she need not do so in 
the way Moller describes. Rather, she helps define and pursue 
aims that she and her spouse share; she helps foster her spouse’s 
commitment to projects, practices, and convictions that make up 
their shared existence; and so on. In short, she helps determine, in 
just the ways we described above, what kind of person her spouse 
turns out to be and what sort of life they share. So the fact that 
someone who survives her spouse’s death manages, after a brief 
period, to build some new life that is roughly as happy and worth-
while as her old one is not, by itself, troubling in the way that 
Moller claims. Provided that, in the course of cultivating a rela-
tionship of care and trust, the now deceased spouse helped deter-
mine what kind of person the survivor turned out to be, the spouse 
made a significant difference to the survivor’s life in a way that 
helps make for a good relationship. To be clear, this does not mean 
that helping determine what sort of person one’s spouse turns out 
to be is necessary for having a good marriage. Rather, our point is 
that, together with other features of the relationship, this can be 
sufficient for a good marriage, whether or not one plays a vital role 
in improving the spouse’s functioning.35  
Now that we have articulated Moller’s assumptions about the roles 
that our spouses must play in order to make a significant differ-
ence to our lives, we can better grasp what it means, on Moller’s 
view, for our spouses to be irreplaceable in such roles; and we can 
assess the significance of such irreplaceability. Our spouses pro-
vide us with security, sexual intimacy, and other goods that con-
tribute to the quality of our lives. Moller claims that when some-
one who survives her spouse’s death remarries after a brief inter-
val, she thereby shows that, although her previous spouse might 
have played significant roles in promoting her flourishing, the 
spouse was replaceable in those roles — they could have been 
played, roughly equally well, by someone else.36 We might say that 
the previous spouse was instrumentally replaceable from the sur-
vivor’s perspective. That is, the previous spouse served as a means 
of securing certain goods, for example, having a sense of security, 
                                                 
35 Lewis expresses a similar view in A Grief Observed (pp. 60 and 61) 
when he describes respects in which his now deceased wife helped de-
termine how, and in what circumstances, he experiences joy. 
36 “Love and Death,” pp. 309–310. 
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that the survivor valued as ends; or he served as an instance of cer-
tain goods, for example, having some companion or other, in 
which the survivor had a general interest. And the fact that the 
survivor remarries quickly shows that someone else could serve, 
roughly equally well, as a means of securing the former goods, or 
as an instance of the latter.   
But once we recognize that this is the sense in which the previous 
spouse was replaceable, the fact that he was replaceable does not 
seem particularly troubling. To begin with, the fact that he was re-
placeable in this sense is unsurprising. It is commonplace for peo-
ple who fall in love with each other to enter into a fulfilling roman-
tic relationship; break up, say, due to strain associated with finan-
cial hardships or career demands; and go on to form comparably 
fulfilling romantic relationships with other people. Similarly, 
someone who survives her spouse’s death may find that there are 
others who could, in the right circumstances, provide her with 
comparable security, companionship, and so on; it seems unrea-
sonable to expect otherwise. But the banal truth that there may be 
multiple people who could make us happy is not just unsurprising; 
it is also relatively insignificant. Of course, some may greatly value 
romantic relationships in which each person is instrumentally ir-
replaceable to the other.37 But, according to the conception of a 
good marriage that we accept, and which, we believe, is widely 
shared and well worth valuing, our spouses’ irreplaceability as 
mere means of securing our ends, or as mere instances of goods in 
which we have some general interest, contributes little to the qual-
ity of our relationships with them. Our spouses are irreplaceable in 
the respects that matter most, not in virtue of their relation to oth-
er things we value, but rather, in virtue of attitudes that we adopt 
toward them, in their particularity. 
More precisely, in marriages that conform to the ideal we are now 
describing, each person adopts at least two attitudes toward her 
spouse that — we might say, speaking somewhat loosely — give the 
spouse a somewhat different kind of irreplaceability. But, crucial-
ly, the fact that someone remarries shortly after her spouse’s death 
does not show that her previous spouse lacked this sort of irre-
                                                 
37 See The Platters’ song “Only You (And You Alone),” written by Buck 
Ram (New York: Polygram Records Inc., 1960). 
17 
 
placeability.38 To be clear, it may be that, in a good marriage, one 
also adopts other attitudes that, in some sense, render one’s 
spouse irreplaceable, but the two attitudes that we will describe 
seem especially important in this regard. First, in a marriage that 
conforms to this ideal, a person loves her spouse, say, in virtue of 
his beautiful smile, his wry humor, and so on; but her love does 
not simply derive from a more general interest in these qualities, 
wherever they crop up. Indeed, she may find some of these quali-
ties intimidating, or off-putting in some other way, when she en-
counters them in other people. Rather, she is, in large part, capti-
vated by these qualities as they appear in her spouse’s particular 
case. Similar remarks apply to a loving parent’s attitude toward 
her child. Such a parent may be captivated by her own child’s 
pluck and preciousness, though she is generally indifferent to 
these traits, or even slightly annoyed by them, in other children. In 
each case, a person values her beloved in the beloved’s particulari-
ty. 
Second, in such a marriage, someone opens herself up to experi-
encing and appreciating her spouse’s qualities directly, without 
regard to their ranking relative to other people’s qualities. In other 
words, she cultivates an immediate, non-comparative appreciation 
of her spouse, though, of course, she might appreciate her spouse’s 
comparative excellence as well. So, if she loves her spouse, in part, 
in virtue of his sense of adventure and the warmth of his embrace, 
then she is apt, in certain kinds of circumstances and certain phas-
es of the relationship, to contemplate these qualities; and they are 
apt to seem uniquely wonderful to her. But she does not view her 
spouse in this way, say, because she has conducted a careful study 
of other people’s traits and concluded that her spouse’s traits are 
more worthy of esteem. Rather, her spouse’s qualities tend to fill 
her mind, driving other people — including people who may be 
suited to serve as instrumental replacements for her spouse — 
from the center of her attention.39 Again, a loving parent tends to 
                                                 
38 Our discussion of this point is indebted to Robert Adams, “Grace,” in 
Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 
150–171.  
39 See Adams, “Grace,” pp. 168–171 and Troy Jollimore, Love’s Vision 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 41–44 and 82–88. See 
also The Flamingos’ song “I Only Have Eyes for You,” written by Al Du-
bin and Harry Warren (New York: End Records, 1959). 
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adopt a similar attitude toward her child. To take an example from 
Robert Adams, such a parent may tend to contemplate her baby’s 
smile and find it utterly enchanting, even though countless other 
babies have smiles that are no less wonderful.40 Furthermore, one 
might adopt a related attitude toward beloved works of art. Some-
one who loves Miles Davis’s “Blue in Green” and Count Basie’s 
“One O’Clock Jump” may sometimes become so immersed in the 
melancholy beauty of the former that, during these periods, she is 
incapable of appreciating the joyful exuberance of the latter, and 
uninterested in determining which is the better tune.41 In each 
case, someone tends to devote a kind of focused attention to a be-
loved object, and her attention renders that object, in certain re-
spects, beyond comparison. 
So, in marriages that conform to the ideal we are now describing, 
our spouses are irreplaceable to us in the following loose sense: we 
love them largely in virtue of their particular characteristics, and 
we are apt to attend to them in ways that render them beyond 
comparison in some respects. But, crucially, the fact that someone 
recovers from grief and remarries shortly after her spouse’s death 
does not show that the previous spouse lacked this sort of irre-
placeability. Someone who loves her spouse in virtue of the 
spouse’s particular qualities might also love other people, for ex-
ample, her friends or siblings, in virtue of their particular quali-
ties. And if she survives her spouse’s death and, through the op-
eration of the kinds of psychological adaptive mechanisms that we 
discussed above, proves resilient after the loss, then she may, after 
a brief period, come to love some new romantic partner in virtue 
of that new partner’s particular qualities. Similarly, someone who, 
on some occasions, devotes focused attention to her spouse’s char-
acteristics might also, on other occasions, devote such attention, 
say, to her child’s characteristics. And if she survives her spouse’s 
death and, shortly thereafter, adapts to the loss and remarries, 
then she may devote such attention to the new spouse’s character-
istics as well. Put another way, the attitudes that render our 
spouses irreplaceable in this sense are aspects of a kind of love 
                                                 
40 “Grace,” p. 169. 
41 Miles Davis, “Blue in Green,” written by Miles Davis and Bill Evans 
(New York: Columbia, 1959); William “Count” Basie, “One O’Clock 
Jump,” written by William “Count” Basie (Santa Monica: Verve, 1957). 
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that we expect to find in a good marriage. It seems reasonable, in 
light of the bereavement research that we described above, to be-
lieve that people who love their spouses in this way are likely to 
remarry relatively quickly when their spouses die. So the fact that 
someone adapts to the loss and remarries shortly after her 
spouse’s death does not show that she failed to regard her spouse 
with a kind of love that is characteristic of good marriages, nor 
does it show that the previous spouse lacked the sort of irreplacea-
bility that is associated with such love.   
So the argument from unimportance fails to show that there is 
something regrettable about someone’s recovering from grief and 
remarrying shortly after her spouse’s death. The argument’s main 
claim, namely, that the survivor’s reacting to the loss in this way 
shows that her now deceased spouse was unimportant to her, rests 
on something like the following assumption: to be important to 
someone, or in other words, to make a significant difference to her 
life, one must play some indispensable role in improving her func-
tioning and be instrumentally irreplaceable in that role. But this 
assumption fails. On one familiar, plausible conception, there are 
other ways in which spouses in good marriages can be important 
to each other, and irreplaceable to each other. And our spouses 
can be important to us, and irreplaceable to us, in these ways, re-
gardless of whether we prove resilient and form new relationships 
shortly after they die.   
The Argument from Desertion 
Some classic literary discussions of grief present another, related 
argument for the view that when we recover from our intense sad-
ness and get on with our lives shortly after the deaths of people 
who are close to us, we manifest grave deficiencies in our relation-
ships with them. This second argument, the argument from deser-
tion, states that reacting to the loss in this way is regrettable, in 
one respect, because it amounts to abandoning the person who 
died. As we said above, the argument from unimportance and ar-
gument from desertion express complementary worries about re-
silience: according to the first argument, recovering quickly from 
the debilitating sadness of grief over the deaths of our loved ones 
shows that, before their deaths, these people failed to occupy cer-
tain significant roles in our lives; and, according to the second ar-
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gument, such recoveries constitute failures, on our part, to do well 
by our loved ones after their deaths. 
Both Robert Frost and C.S. Lewis offer poignant expressions of 
this second view of grief’s significance. In Frost’s “Home Burial,” a 
mother who grieves inconsolably over the death of her child bitter-
ly describes the “everyday concerns” that occupied her husband 
shortly after the child’s death.42 She observes, with deep regret, 
that when a person is sick and approaching death, he is “alone,” 
and when he dies, he is “more alone.”43 Of course, the deceased 
person’s loved ones may go through the outward motions of stand-
ing by him, say, by attending a memorial service in his honor; but 
inwardly, their minds turn almost immediately to the concerns of 
everyday life. And so, she concludes, before the deceased person 
has even reached the grave, the people who are closest to him have 
begun to abandon him. But the mother resolves that her own grief 
will be different; she will not turn away from her deceased child if 
she can avoid it. 
Lewis describes a related attitude in A Grief Observed. He reports 
that when his wife died, she seemed to go “Alone into the Alone,”44 
and he worried that recovering quickly from grief would amount to 
forgetting her.45 Though he later rejected this view, he was initially 
tempted to view his recovery as a failure to remain faithful to his 
wife, a form of “desertion or divorce.”46  
The argument underlying these grim remarks is best reconstruct-
ed, we believe, in the following way. Part of being a good spouse, 
parent, or member of certain other personal relationships is stand-
ing in certain characteristic forms of solidarity with the other 
member of the relationship. Four forms of solidarity, which may 
overlap, seem especially important, though there may be other rel-
evant forms as well: (1) We might stand in solidarity with our 
loved ones by taking on their projects as our own to some degree; 
                                                 
42 “Home Burial,” line 86. 
43 Ibid., line 101. 
44 A Grief Observed, p. 9. 
45 Ibid., p. 34. 
46 Ibid., p. 42.  
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for example, someone might set aside certain of his career ambi-
tions in order to help his spouse pursue demanding personal 
goals. (2) We might harbor certain hopes for people we love or 
have certain kinds of faith in them, as when a parent clings to the 
hope that, with determination and the right sorts of encourage-
ment, her child can master his college coursework, even though he 
has gotten off to a rocky start. (3) We may be delighted when our 
loved ones flourish and saddened when they suffer misfortunes. 
(4) We might stand in solidarity with loved ones by being present 
with them. Sometimes this involves being physically present, as 
when someone sits by the bedside of a sibling who has had major 
surgery; but it can also involve being present in thought, so to 
speak, as when someone finds herself thinking repeatedly about a 
friend who is undergoing a difficult divorce. These are all ways in 
which we cast our lots with people we love, and our failure to do so 
sometimes constitutes a grave form of desertion, a kind of betray-
al.  
Someone who feels better and adapts to the loss shortly after, say, 
her spouse’s death may seem to desert her spouse in just this way. 
Recovering from grief involves returning to one’s emotional and 
functional baselines, and when someone recovers quickly from 
grief over her spouse’s death, each of these aspects of her recovery 
may seem to constitute a failure of solidarity. First, as we just said, 
part of being a good spouse is standing in solidarity with one’s be-
loved by being delighted when she fares well in certain respects 
and saddened when she suffers certain misfortunes, or in other 
words, by being emotionally invested in her flourishing. In the ab-
sence of factors that make a loved one’s life intolerable, the loss of 
her life is among the greatest losses she can sustain.47 So it may 
seem that when someone recovers quickly from the intense sad-
ness of grief over her beloved’s death, her emotional reaction does 
not adequately reflect the magnitude of the beloved’s misfortune. 
Second, part of being a good spouse is being present with one’s 
beloved in some way, especially when highly significant events oc-
cur in the beloved’s life. So it may seem that when someone who 
survives her beloved’s death becomes absorbed, shortly thereafter, 
in everyday concerns, she does not adequately attend to the person 
who died.  
                                                 
47 Nagel defends this view in “Death,” pp. 1–10. 
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To be clear, this argument concerns cases in which someone re-
covers too quickly from grief over her beloved’s death; it does not 
imply that recovering from grief is regrettable no matter when it 
occurs. The argument rests on the view that part of being a good 
spouse is standing in certain forms of solidarity with one’s be-
loved. Of course, standing in relevant forms of solidarity some-
times involves making considerable personal sacrifices, but on any 
plausible conception of a good marriage, there are limits to what a 
good spouse must do to stand in solidarity with her beloved: she 
need not abandon her own projects every time they conflict with 
her beloved’s aims; she need not cling to favorable judgments 
about her beloved, no matter how overwhelming the evidence to 
the contrary becomes; and she need not endure endless, debilitat-
ing sadness when her beloved dies. In short, the argument states 
that when someone recovers within two or three months from 
grief over her beloved’s death, her reaction to the loss is regretta-
ble, not because she recovers from grief, full stop, but rather be-
cause she recovers too quickly and her grief is only minimally dis-
ruptive.  
The argument from desertion comprises two main branches, the 
first concerns the emotional aspect of recovery from grief, and the 
second concerns the functional aspect. We can best respond to the 
argument if we discuss each branch separately. The first branch 
rests partly on the view that, generally, when someone experiences 
prolonged, intense sadness over her beloved’s death, she thereby 
stands in a valuable form of solidarity with the person who died. 
We find this view plausible, and will suppose, for argument’s sake, 
that it is correct. Nevertheless, this branch of the argument fails 
because, contrary to what it assumes, experiencing prolonged sad-
ness is not the only way to stand in this form of solidarity with 
loved ones who have died, nor is it, in any relevant sense, the best 
way to do so.  
This becomes clear when we consider, on the one hand, some pat-
terns of thought, behavior, and emotional response that are com-
mon among people who recover quickly from sadness over the 
deaths of their loved ones, and on the other hand, some patterns 
that are common among people who experience prolonged, in-
tense sadness after such deaths. Often, when someone proves re-
silient after her beloved’s death, she does not dwell primarily on 
the beloved’s misfortune, her own misfortune, the fact that the re-
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lationship has ended, and so on; at least, she does not dwell pri-
marily on these matters for an extended period. Consider George 
Bonanno’s description of a resilient mother whom he interviewed 
after her daughter’s death in the September 11 terrorist attacks: 
Karen was able to summon calming and soothing recollec-
tions: reminiscences from [her daughter] Claire’s child-
hood, images of her accomplishments, or simply memories 
of daily life together, at the dinner table, walking in a park, 
or caring for their dogs. She seemed to have an endless va-
riety of memories that she could call up to help her feel 
that Claire was still with her.48 
This sort of a resilient survivor experiences an initial period of in-
tense sadness, punctuated by moments of reprieve, and then starts 
to attend not only, or even primarily, to her beloved’s misfortunes, 
but also to features of her beloved and her beloved’s life that com-
fort her, or even make her happy.  
To be clear, this does not mean that the resilient survivor fails to 
grasp the magnitude of her beloved’s misfortune, that she ignores 
the misfortune, or that she suppresses her emotional reaction to it; 
to the contrary, resilient survivors are no more likely than other, 
more distraught survivors to rely on avoidance or distraction to 
cope with loss.49 Rather, the resilient survivor tends, first, to alter-
nate between attending to comforting features of her beloved’s life 
and attending to distressing facts surrounding the beloved’s death, 
and second, she tends to think about these troubling facts when 
she can best deal with the associated negative emotions, for exam-
ple, during periods of relative calm.50 To take an example of the 
latter disposition, Bonanno provides the following description of a 
resilient college student whom he interviewed after her father’s 
death: “Julia Martinez used photos to help remind her of her fa-
ther … She would decide on a good time to remember her father, a 
time when she was unlikely to be interrupted. She would close the 
                                                 
48 Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness, p. 71.  
49 Bonanno et al., “Resilience to Loss.” 
50 We might say — using a description that was suggested, in discussion, 
by Anna Gotlib — that there is a sense in which the resilient survivor 
“compartmentalizes” her sadness over her beloved’s death.  
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door to her room, carefully get out the photos, and let her eyes and 
her mind roam over them.”51 By alternating between comforting 
and distressing thoughts about her beloved, this sort of resilient 
survivor manages, on the whole, to keep her emotions “on an even 
keel.”52 By contrast, in many cases where someone experiences 
prolonged, intense sadness after her beloved’s death, the survivor 
dwells for an extended period on the beloved’s misfortune, on her 
own loss, on the loss of the life that she and her beloved built to-
gether, and so on; and she finds it hard to attend to positive mem-
ories of the beloved.   
When someone who survives her beloved’s death exhibits these 
patterns of thought, behavior, and emotional response that are 
associated with resilience, and as a result, returns within two or 
three months to her emotional baseline, she does not thereby 
abandon the person who died. Rather, other things equal, she 
stands in the very same form of solidarity, to roughly the same de-
gree, as her more distraught counterpart, who is dominated by in-
tense sadness for many months, or even years, after the beloved’s 
death. Like her counterpart, the resilient survivor reacts to her be-
loved’s death in a way that manifests her emotional investment in 
the beloved’s existence, and in his having a good life; to use Robert 
Adams’s phrase, her reaction to the death manifests her “being 
for” the person who died.53 Provided that the resilient and dis-
traught survivors devote similar levels of attention to their loved 
ones, and do so for similar periods of time, the only differences 
between them concern, first, which aspects of their loved ones’ 
lives they attend to and, second, the valence of their emotional re-
actions. The resilient survivor alternates between attending to 
comforting facts about her beloved’s life and attending to distress-
ing facts about the beloved’s death, and, accordingly, she alter-
nates between positive and negative emotional reactions. By con-
trast, the distraught survivor dwells mainly on the beloved’s mis-
fortune and her own loss and, accordingly, experiences prolonged, 
intense sadness. But these differences do not provide any reason 
                                                 
51 Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness, p. 71. 
52 Ibid., p. 74. 
53 Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 15–18. 
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to judge that, while the distraught survivor stands in some valua-
ble form of solidary with her beloved, the resilient survivor does 
not. Both survivors stand in the same form of solidarity with their 
loved ones, though they adopt different and incompatible, but 
similarly effective, ways of doing so. So this first branch of the ar-
gument from desertion does not show that there is anything re-
grettable about being emotionally resilient after the deaths of peo-
ple who are close to us.  
The second branch rests partly on the following view: generally, 
when someone who survives her beloved’s death becomes so ab-
sorbed in thoughts about the beloved that her own ability to work 
and perform other vital tasks is substantially undermined for an 
extended period, she thereby stands in a valuable form of solidari-
ty with the person who died. Put another way, such a survivor de-
votes a kind of focused attention to her beloved, and so she is pre-
sent with him in some sense that is well worth caring about. Again, 
we find this view plausible, and will suppose, for argument’s sake, 
that it is right. But this branch of the argument also assumes that 
when someone survives her beloved’s death and then manages, 
after a brief period of substantial disruption, to focus on her job, 
her other relationships, and so on, she thereby fails to attend ade-
quately to the person who died. And this assumption fails. Some-
one who attends to such everyday concerns shortly after her be-
loved’s death may nevertheless avoid any serious failure of solidar-
ity with the person who died.  
When someone returns to her functional baseline shortly after her 
beloved’s death, she may remain present with her beloved, not by 
devoting so much attention to him that she cannot attend to other 
matters, but rather, by pursuing the right kinds of aims, with the 
right kinds of attitudes. More precisely, she may remain present 
with the beloved, and so, stand in solidarity with him, in at least 
the following respects, which can overlap: (1) She might adopt, to 
some degree, certain of her beloved’s projects as her own; for ex-
ample, she may volunteer for a charitable organization that he av-
idly supported. (2) She may continue to pursue, by herself, pro-
jects that she and her beloved once pursued together. She might, 
say, start a business that she and her beloved had planned to open 
together, or she may carry out some artistic project that they had 
begun. (3) She may take on new projects that serve to commemo-
rate her beloved, for example, making a quilt from his clothing, or 
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reading his favorite books. (4) Finally, she may remain present 
with her beloved in a limited, but important, way by adopting cer-
tain attitudes that help form the background against which she 
pursues her aims. For example, she may recognize that her be-
loved would be delighted or proud if he could see the range of new 
skills that she acquired in order to lead a happy, worthwhile life in 
his absence, and she may derive comfort and encouragement from 
that recognition. 
Of course, there is a sense in which, even if she adopts such aims 
and attitudes, someone who survives her beloved’s death and re-
turns, within two or three months, to her functional baseline gets 
on with her life fairly quickly. The crucial point is that getting on 
with one’s life in the way we just described is not a form of deser-
tion. So this second branch of the argument, like the first, fails to 
show that someone who proves resilient after her beloved’s death 
thereby fails to do well by the beloved. We might say, drawing on 
our responses to both branches of the argument, that we can re-
member deceased loved ones, and have appropriate emotional re-
actions to their deaths, whether or not we experience prolonged, 
debilitating sadness over the loss. 
Anxieties Revisited 
Nevertheless, we — the authors — remain somewhat uneasy about 
the prospect of recovering from grief within two or three months 
after a loved one’s death. So we will close by briefly considering 
the relation between our responses to the arguments that we dis-
cussed, and the anxieties about grief and recovery that we de-
scribed in the opening section. One obvious suggestion is that, alt-
hough the arguments considered above fail to show that there is 
something regrettable about resilience after a loved one’s death, 
there are other considerations that establish this conclusion. 
Though we cannot rule out this suggestion, we do not find it prom-
ising, and we will set it aside.   
But, even in the absence of further considerations that identify 
something regrettable about being resilient after a loved one’s 
death, some anxiety about such resilience may be appropriate. 
First, the arguments that we discussed, including the argument 
concerning deficiencies in love that we discussed in the opening 
section, fail to show that someone’s resilience after a loved one’s 
death reliably indicates some deficiency in her relationship with 
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the beloved; but they still raise the possibility that the survivor’s 
relationship was deficient, say, because she failed to care deeply 
about the person who died or because she deserted him. And en-
tertaining this possibility in the course of demonstrating that it 
does not obtain in one’s own case may be initially unsettling. Sec-
ond, confronting the possibility of deserting a loved one who has 
died might also be unsettling in another way. As we just argued, 
being resilient after a loved one’s death need not constitute a fail-
ure of solidarity with the beloved; nevertheless, to avoid such a 
failure, a resilient survivor must carry out the often difficult task of 
determining just how much she must do, and just how long she 
must do it, in order to attend appropriately to the person who 
died. This task may be daunting, perhaps more so in communities 
that lack established mourning rituals that help shape people’s 
views about how to attend to the dead, and when to return to nor-
mal life.  
So our discussion bears on anxieties about recovering quickly from 
grief over a loved one’s death, but not, as one might initially ex-
pect, by helping show that such anxieties are wholly inappropriate. 
Rather, the discussion provides grounds for hope that if someone 
experiences such a recovery, and as a result, begins to doubt the 
quality of her relationship with a loved one who has died, she may 
find, looking back over the course of the relationship, that it was 
good in relevant respects; and she may find, looking forward, that 
it remains possible for her to stand in solidarity with her beloved. 
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